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Beyond Binary:
Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind
Robin Dembroff (Yale University)
We want to know what gender is. But metaphysical approaches to
this question solely have focused on the binary gender kinds men and
women. By overlooking those who identify outside of the binary–the
group I call ‘genderqueer’–we are left without tools for understand-
ing these new and quickly growing gender identifications. This meta-
physical gap in turn creates a conceptual lacuna that contributes to
systematic misunderstanding of genderqueer persons. In this pa-
per, I argue that to better understand genderqueer identities, we
must recognize a new type of gender kind: critical gender kinds, or
kinds whose members collectively resist dominant gender ideology.
After developing a model of critical gender kinds, I suggest that
genderqueer is best modeled as a critical gender kind that stands in
opposition to ‘the binary assumption’, or the prevalent assumption
that the only possible genders are the binary, discrete, exclusive, and
exhaustive kinds men and women.
1 Introduction
Dissatisfaction with strict binary gender systems is nothing new.1 Nor is the
creation of language, modes of expression, or body modifications aimed at trans-
gressing this binary. What is new are widespread and legitimized conversations
surrounding this dissatisfaction.2 Just in the last ten years, web searches for
‘genderqueer’ and ‘nonbinary’ have grown by a magnitude of at least ten times.3
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary added both terms, the Associated Press Style-
book embraces ‘they’ as a singular gender-neutral pronoun, and highly visible
popular publications such as Teen Vogue and The New York Times have run
articles exploring the concept of identifying outside the gender binary.4 This
is not to mention that multiple US states now offer nonbinary gender markers
on government identification, with ever more municipalities and states following
suit.
1Many cultures do not have dominant binary gender systems, such as the Bugis of Indonesia
and Native American Great Plains tribes.
2See, e.g., White et al (2018, 244) for empirical evidence supporting this claim.
3Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends).
4“genderqueer” & “nonbinary” (2018), Sopelsa (2017), Papisova (2016), Greenberg (2017).
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Despite this public attention, nonbinary gender identities have been an af-
terthought within philosophy of gender, and especially metaphysical discussions
of gender.5 The central phenomenon under consideration has been the binary
genders men and women.6 Narrowing the target phenomenon in this way has
generated two problems–one metaphysical and the other political.
First, by overlooking nonbinary identities, existing metaphysical approaches
to gender are insufficient for capturing persons who reject (exclusive) catego-
rization as either men or women (see §3). This creates a gap of metaphysical
explanation and understanding. For example, what is the relationship between
gender neutral language and being nonbinary? Or between androgyny and being
nonbinary? What (if anything) unifies the vast variety of nonbinary identifica-
tions? Is there anything more to being nonbinary than calling oneself by a
nonbinary label? These questions are metaphysically significant, but the theo-
ries on offer provide no answers.
Second, without the resources for understanding nonbinary gender identities,
we sustain a conceptual lacuna surrounding nonbinary persons. This lacuna
does not only reflect a gap in philosophical understanding: it contributes to
a hermeneutical injustice that arises from the failure to spread and charitably
analyze the concepts and practices underlying nonbinary classifications.7 In the
wake of this conceptual silence, misunderstandings (both blatant and subtle)
arise in droves – misunderstandings that undermine recognition and respect of
nonbinary persons.8
These two problems can be ameliorated by an account of genderqueer as what
I call a ‘critical gender kind’, or a kind whose members enact resistance against
dominant gender ideology. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category
whose members collectively resist the binary assumption, or the assumption
that the only possible genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and
women, and do so based on felt or desired gender categorization that conflicts
with this binary.9 I unpack this proposal in §4.
5See, e.g., Haslanger (2012), Jenkins (2016), A´sta (2011), and Barnes (forthcoming). Even
discussions of gender that purport to be trans inclusive typically overlook the experiences and
concepts underlying genderqueer identity. See, e.g., Bettcher (2009, 2013), Jenkins (2016),
Briggs and George (manuscript), and McKitrick (2015). This is especially striking given
that 29% of respondents to the 2015 United States Transgender Survey self-identified as
‘genderqueer’. James, et al. (2016). Philosophy is not alone in this oversight. See Salamon
(2010, 95) for a similar criticism of Women’s Studies.
6Though see Dembroff & Wodak (2018) & Dembroff (2018) as exceptions.
7Hermeneutical injustice, as defined in Fricker (2007, 1), occurs “when a gap in collective
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense
of their social experiences.” More extended notions of hermeneutical injustice are explored in
Medina (2012) and Appiah (1994), which include cases (such as white ignorance) when a gap
in the collective interpretive resources regarding an oppressed group perpetuates the social
disadvantage of that group. I take it that the lacuna at issue concerning nonbinary kinds
manifests in both ways.
8Using Fraser’s (1998) account, this might be understood in terms of genderqueers’ access
to ‘participatory parity’, or the conditions needed to interact with others as peers in social
and political settings.
9I use the word ‘model’ intentionally. Following Paul (2012), I endorse a method of meta-
physics focused on building theoretical models for certain purposes, rather constructing (real)
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My model has many implications, and no doubt will inspire as many worries.
Like most philosophical theories, mine probably is wrong. But I believe it is
closer to the truth than analytic philosophers have come so far, if only because
we have had little to say about nonbinary identifications. What’s more, it is
clear that this theorizing is overdue: even empirical social research on trans iden-
tities frequently lumps together trans binary and genderqueer persons, making
it difficult to use this data to explain why, for example, genderqueer persons
overall face heightened discrimination and psychological distress compared to
trans binary persons, and also differ with respect to attitudes toward medical
interventions such as hormone therapy.10 If I am right–or even close to it–this
heterogeneity should come as no surprise, since genderqueer conjoins persons
who are extremely diverse across self-understanding and gender presentation
(among other things).
2 Terminology & Methodology
‘Genderqueer’ was first coined in the 1990’s by trans activist Riki Wilchins
in an attempt to describe those who were both queer with respect to their
sexuality and “the kind of gendertrash society rejected” with respect to their
gender intelligibility in public spaces.11 Since then, use has shifted away from
mere description and towards identity: in particular, it often functions as an
umbrella term for a range of gender identities outside of the binary.12 I will use
the term in keeping with this recent shift, but my primary concern is not with
articulating “the true meaning of ‘genderqueer’ ”, but rather with articulating
a gender phenomenon that has been ignored in analytic philosophy.
My analysis relies heavily on personal testimony from genderqueer persons.
This is not only because there is a scant amount of academic research about
genderqueer persons, but also because I share the familiar feminist commit-
ment to begin theorizing from the perspective of the marginalized. That said,
I distinguish between two kinds of testimony. The first concerns genderqueer
individuals’ intuitions about paradigm or uncontested examples of persons who
do not identify exclusively as men or as women. The second concerns these
individuals’ views about metaphysical questions concerning what, more gen-
erally, it means to be genderqueer. I rely on the first kind of testimony and
not the second. Substantive metaphysical questions about genderqueer deserve
careful analysis in just the same way that women and men have been given
careful metaphysical analysis. In this, I follow Bettcher (2014) in relying on
persons’ first-person authority over their own gender, while simultaneously al-
definitions.
10See Rimes, et al., (2018), Galupo et al. (2018), 5, Bradford et a. (2018), 8, and Warren
et al. (2016). Following Heyes (2003), cf Stryker (1994), I use ‘trans’ to refer to the “multiple
forms of sex and gender crossing and mixing that are taken by their practitioners to be
significant life projects.” I use ‘trans binary’ to prefer to persons who are trans but identify
exclusively within the male/female binary.
11Wilchins (2017), 80-81.
12Wilchins (2017), 80-81.
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lowing for substantive disagreement about the conditions for kind membership.
My central concern, in other words, is not individuals’ experiences, but rather
the larger concepts that frame genderqueer identity – in particular, the concepts
that structure commonality among the language, aesthetic expressions, values,
and actions found among those who (within contemporary western societies)
identify as neither solely male nor female.
Notably, I am not primarily concerned with how genderqueers are under-
stood within dominant contexts, which typically have no or a distorted under-
standing of nonbinary persons. Rather, I focus on the practices and concepts
surrounding genderqueer within trans-friendly communities, and especially by
genderqueers themselves. Here I again follow Bettcher (2013, 234-5), who ar-
gues that assuming dominant gender meanings and concepts is a “bad place”
to start feminist theorizing, as it “effectively yield[s] political ground from the
very beginning.”
Finally, and relatedly, throughout this paper, I refer to genderqueer as a
gender kind. My reader might wonder why I do so: why take genderqueer to
be a gender kind, rather than some other sort of social kind? I cannot offer a
complete argument for my answer here. The abbreviated argument, however,
is that – along with Elizabeth Barnes (forthcoming) – I do not think that we
should approach the metaphysics of gender by looking for kinds that correspond
one-to-one with the gender terms we use to describe individuals (e.g., ‘woman’,
‘man’). The terminological taxonomy of gender classification need not, and I
think does not, align with the most useful metaphysical taxonomy of gender
kinds. Rather, I approach the project of metaphysical inquiry into gender kinds
as the project of inquiring into the kinds that reinforce or resist hierarchical,
male-dominant social systems. Genderqueer, as I’ll argue in what follows, is one
such kind. For this reason, while I incorporate testimony from those who do
use the label ‘genderqueer’, I do not take it that the kind I call genderqueer
is one that contains all and only those who identify themselves using the label
‘genderqueer’. My focus, rather, is on using this testimony and other evidence
to get a clearer picture of what, if anything, best characterizes the group of
persons who do not exclusively identify as men or as women.
3 First Attempts
Within popular culture, most proposed definitions of genderqueer fall into one
of two camps. On one approach, someone is genderqueer because they have cer-
tain external features–typically, because they are androgynous, gender fluid, or
otherwise violate gender norms. On another approach, someone is genderqueer
because of a particular internal feature–namely, self-identification–leaving open
what, exactly, it might mean to ‘identify’ outside of the binary.
It is instructive to note that most available metaphysical analyses of gender
also take one of these two approaches.13 On externalist approaches, someone’s
13I here focus on constructionist accounts of gender, setting aside biological essentialism.
Even if one is a biological essentialist, though, it is hopefully obvious that this approach
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gender is determined by social factors that are external to them: for example,
being perceived as androgynous or otherwise gender non-conforming. In con-
trast, internalist approaches focus on articulating more concretely what it means
to ‘identify’ with a particular gender. On these accounts, someone’s gender is
determined not by how they are perceived by others, but rather by whatever
internal features (e.g., self-understanding, behavioral dispositions) constitute
their gender identity.14
I argue that neither an externalist nor internalist approach will provide a
satisfactory account of genderqueer. Both misclassify paradigm cases of gen-
derqueer (and non-genderqueer) individuals. Examining closely why this is the
case is instructive. Not only will it clear the ground for my own proposal, but it
also provides an opportunity to examine these paradigm cases, as well as gen-
derqueer persons’ testimony concerning their own identities. Such testimony
illuminates not only why externalist and internalist approaches fall short, but
also why genderqueer is best understood as a critical gender category.
3.1 An Externalist Approach
External theories of gender, sometimes also called social position theories–focus
on gender as a social structure that advantages or disadvantages individuals
according to the collective norms, expectations, and stereotypes surrounding
the features that an individual is perceived to have. Externalist theories have
been proposed or defended by Haslanger (2012), Barnes (forthcoming), Witt
(2011), and A´sta (2011), among others.15 There are many potential ways to
spell out what external social factors determine an individual’s gender. For my
purposes, the details of various externalist accounts is not centrally important.
What is important, rather, is to see a trend among all of them: namely, that
membership in a given gender kind is based solely on factors that are external
to any given individual–e.g., social roles, perception, or treatment.
In light of this, what would be the best externalist approach to genderqueer?
Whatever it is, it must highlight only features that are external to genderqueer
persons, while also capturing paradigm cases of those identifying outside the
binary, as these persons are understood within trans-friendly communities.
The most common–and, I think, plausible–externalist approach to genderqueer
will not suffice to analyze genderqueer. While some intersex persons are genderqueer, being
intersex is neither sufficient nor necessary for being genderqueer. See, e.g. Weiss (2018).
14As Barnes (forthcoming) notes, while these are the main approaches, some theories fall
outside this taxonomy, such as Stoljar (2011), Briggs and George (manuscript), and Bach
(2012).
15Theodore Bach (2012) defends a view of gender on which genders are ‘natural kinds with
historical essences’–a view that is difficult to place within the external/internalist taxonomy.
On Bach’s view, to be, e.g., a woman, is to molded by conscious and unconscious social
mechanisms into a reproduction of historical exemplars of women so as to perform the social
function corresponding to women. On Bach’s view, then, someone might be a trans man
and yet–according to Bach’s analysis–be “construed as a woman” (260). Moreover, given
that man and woman are the only kinds into which one can be socialized (within Western
cultures), all genderqueer persons (who have been socialized as either women or men) will not
be represented within Bach’s analysis.
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focuses on someone’s perceived relation to gender norms and roles, and espe-
cially to masculine and feminine gender presentation. Indeed, a brief foray into
popular media might suggest that someone is genderqueer because they “do
things that are outside of the norm of their actual or perceived gender iden-
tity,” or because they “express a combination of masculinity and femininity,
or neither, in their gender expression.”16 A similar idea is echoed by popular
articles, books, and visual media that equivocate between or constantly asso-
ciate being nonbinary with androgyny or gender non-conformity.17 Admittedly,
this thinking is reinforced by the observation that many genderqueers fit this
description: it is common for persons who identify outside the binary to adopt
an aesthetic that defies gender expectations–often, one that is androgynous or
is fluid between masculine and feminine elements.18 Add to this that other be-
haviors often associated with nonbinary persons also break gender norms, such
as using gender-neutral pronouns or refusing classification as either ‘straight’ or
‘gay’.19 With these considerations, it might seem that the best way to analyze
genderqueer will be something like the following:
Genderqueer (externalist): Genderqueer is the category of per-
sons who either
(i) are reliably perceived as attempting to not exclusively adopt ei-
ther a feminized or masculinized gender expression;
or:
(ii) cannot be reliably coded as having either a male or female
body.20
In other words, on this proposal, someone is genderqueer in a context just in
case they either are perceived as transgressing binary norms of gender expression–
for example, by adopting a gender fluid or agender aesthetic–or their body is
perceived as androgynous, where this is understood as one’s body being ‘un-
readable’ as male or female.
Despite the many merits of this approach, I think it falls short of a successful
account genderqueer. Examining why sheds light on why, I think, any externalist
approach will be dissatisfactory. While many genderqueers do meet the above
proposed condition, two further things are true. First, these persons often
16See Clements (2017) and the entry for “Genderqueer” on Wikipedia.
17See, e.g., Dowling (2017), Ferguson (2017), Petrow (2016).
18See the Instagram hashtag “#thisiswhatnblookslike.”
19For more evidence on the connection between trans identifications and violating het-
eronormative gender expectations and roles, see Diamond and Butterworth (2008) and Green
(2004). See also Nagoshi, et al. (2012), in which participants took their sexual orientation to
be “dynamically related” to their gender identity, suggesting that being nonbinary often rules
out, for these persons, being either ‘straight’ or ‘gay’.
20These descriptions bear similarity to Elizabeth Barnes’s (forthcoming) description of the
‘gender outlier’ and ‘gender confounder’. Barnes, who is sympathetic to Sally Haslanger’s
(2012) picture on which gender is a hierarchical system that socially positions persons in
different ways based on their perceived features, describes the gender outlier and confounder as
those who are systematically subordinated due to being perceived (respectively) as attempting
to switch between binary gender roles or as androgynous.
6
describe their androgyny or rejection of traditional gender aesthetic norms as
an expression but not the totality of being genderqueer, emphasizing in addition
an emotional or political orientation toward the gender binary. When asked
to describe their experience of being genderqueer, in fact, there is repeated
and explicit rejection of the idea that being genderqueer is solely based on
gender presentation or on others’ perceptions. In their article “This Is What
Gender-Nonbinary People Look Like”, trans activist Meridith Talusan asked
genderqueer persons to describe their experience of identifying outside of the
gender binary. While answers varied in their details, a common theme emerged:
the category genderqueer is not reducible to a group of persons who are perceived
in a particular way. One interviewee, Rowan Keeney, put this quite bluntly:
My expression and my socialization falls on the femme side, but
being nonbinary is not about what is perceived of me. Nonbinary
is the liberation from the need to make myself smaller to fit into
preconceived ideas of who and what I am.21
Keeney’s point is independently reiterated by other genderqueer persons,
who express that “there is no one way to be nonbinary”, that “name[s], pro-
nouns, and presentation does not define [a nonbinary individual’s] gender”, and
that genderqueers “have all types of gender presentations”, “identify as fem-
inine and masculine to different degrees”, and “don’t need to look or act or
be a certain way to be nonbinary”.22 Susanna Weiss, a writer for Teen Vogue
who identifies as both genderqueer and a woman, is particularly explicit on this
point:
Many people seem to believe you need an androgynous style to be
non-binary, creating the assumption that I and other non-binary
people who wear women’s clothes must be women... But you can’t
tell how someone identifies based on what they look like.23
These statements and many others suggest that genderqueer’s extension
reaches only to those who are perceived to fall outside of binary gender roles,
or to have an androgynous presentation.
Complimenting this point is a second observation: namely, that the exter-
nalist approach would also overextended. Many individuals who do not identify
as and would not be considered genderqueer either defy binary gender roles or
maintain androgyny.24 Butch lesbians, queens, cross-dressing men and women,
trans men and women who do not ‘blend’ as cisgender, and the variety of men
and women whose bodies and presentations are androgynous are but a few ex-
amples of this. Lori Watson, examining shared experiences between gender
nonconforming persons, trans and not, vividly captures this point:
21Talusan (2017), emphasis added.
22Talusan (2017), Weiss (2018).
23Weiss (2018).
24For empirical discussion, see Bradford, et al. (2018).
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Trans women and I share an especially acute problem. [W]e both
want our gender to be seen as a way of being a woman...who doesn’t
have to offer up her bona fides to the world anytime someone is
confused, perplexed or unsettled when they perceive our gender and
sex as incongruous or ambiguous.25
In short, genderqueers do not have a monopoly on being perceived as violat-
ing gender roles, much less on androgyny: plenty of non-genderqueer men and
women share in this experience.26
While taking genderqueer as non-reducible to any particular social percep-
tions may seem initially odd, it comes into better focus when we take seriously
that being genderqueer is not so much about rejecting femininity and masculin-
ity de re, but rather rejecting them as concepts that always are appropriate
for interpreting an individual’s behavior or aesthetic.27 That is, according to
genderqueer persons, being genderqueer need not be about refusing clothing,
behaviors, speech, or roles that typically would be read as feminine, masculine,
or any combination of the two. Rather, it often concerns rejecting the binary
at a conceptual level – that is, rejecting the idea that their way of being in the
world always should be understood via the binary concepts of ‘feminine’ and
‘masculine’.28 In an interview with The Washington Post, 18-year-old Kelsey
Beckham, who identifies as nonbinary, states:
I don’t want to be a girl wearing boy’s clothes, nor do I want to
be a girl who presents as a boy. I just want to be a person who is
recognized as a person. That’s how I’m most comfortable. I’m just
a person wearing people clothes.29
The bold assertion of being ‘just a person wearing people clothes’ strikes
as the heart of any attempt to analyze genderqueer solely in terms of external
perceptions. Genderqueers differ widely with respect to their assigned sex, per-
ceived sex, and whether or not they function within traditionally masculinized
or feminized gender roles. If anything holds them in common with respect to
gender presentation, it is only a general rejection of having their presentation
interpreted through a binary lens.30 But I will get to this in §4.
25Watson (2015).
26A further, normative worry arises for taking genderqueer in terms of androgyny in par-
ticular: for many body sizes and shapes, androgyny is difficult if not impossible to access.
Persons in this position would be simply barred from access to genderqueer.
27See, e.g. Weiss (2018) who writes that being gender, for them, mean “reject[ing] the whole
concept of gender.”
28For example, Weiss quotes Cantrell as saying “I wish that people wouldn’t automatically
use she/her pronouns just because of how I present... They need to stop gendering people’s
presentations.” As Naomi Scheman pointed out to me, the plea to end gendering based on
presentation is important, as it reveals a political stance that–intentionally or not–queers
everyone’s gender.
29Hesse (2014), my emphasis.
30See also “Gender Can Be Both Liberating And Stifling At The Same Time” (2018), in
which one interviewee comments, “Just because I put on lipstick doesn’t mean I am one thing
or the other, because someone decided a piece of paint ‘belonged’ to a gender.”
8
3.2 An Internalist Approach
If looking only to external features will not provide an adequate analysis of
genderqueer, what about looking to internal features? Perhaps an internalist
approach, or an approach on which genderqueer is understood as a group of per-
sons with particular psychological features, has more promise. In favor of this
approach, it at least appears to align nicely with what is by far the most com-
mon popular definition of being genderqueer as ‘identifying as genderqueer’.31
If we assume ‘identification’ is best understood as a wholly internal feature–
i.e., a psychological state that an individual can be in without any external
manifestations–then an internalist approach to genderqueer would be on the
right track. I’ll propose in §4 that we should prefer a different, political model
of genderqueer. But let’s examine the merits of an internalist account.
The first and most important question for an internalist approach to gen-
derqueer is what internal features we are referring to when we talk about ‘gender
identity’. Since the concept of gender identity–and in particular, genderqueer
identity–is used to determine the extension of genderqueer, it is crucial to un-
derstand what genderqueer identity would amount to. What’s more, as Jenkins
(forthcoming) points out, the most common ‘folk’ definition of gender identity–
“a sense of oneself as a man, woman, or some other gender”–does not appear
promising. Jenkins writes:
[M]any people who use the language of gender identity hold...the
view that gender terms such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ ought to be
understood in terms of gender identity: [e.g.] to be a woman is to
identify as a woman (or, to have a female gender identity)... The
combination of this view with the folk definition of gender identity
gives rise to a circularity: someone who asks what it means to say
that a certain person ‘has a female gender identity’ will be told that
it means that that person has a sense of herself ‘as a woman’ – but
if the questioner then asks what a ‘woman’ is, they will be told that
a woman is ‘a person with a female gender identity’.
Jenkins’s point about ‘woman’ similarly applies to ‘genderqueer’. The com-
bination of two popular notions–that being genderqueer is identifying as gen-
derqueer, and identifying as genderqueer is being genderqueer–leaves us in a
hopeless and unhelpful circularity. Whatever it means to ‘identify as genderqueer’–
if indeed this is the basis for understanding the category genderqueer, must be
something more substantive.
Within analytic philosophy, a few internalist proposals have emerged with
more substantive notions of gender identity.32At first, this substantive internal-
ism might seem to worryingly essentialize gender by pointing to a mysterious,
31The language of ‘gender identity’ as a determiner of one’s gender–and, in particular, of
being genderqueer, is standard within trans-friendly contexts. See Weiss (2018) and Talu-
san (2017), as well as genderqueer networking platforms such as http://genderqueer.me or
http://beyondthebinary.co.uk.
32On Talia Bettcher’s (2009), (2013) view, a person’s gender is based on sincere self-
identification, understood in terms of ‘living as’ the gender with which one identifies, I will
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innate sense of one’s own gender that exists independently of external social
factors. But, in fact, philosophical accounts of gender identity avoid this worry:
gender identity, on these accounts, is internal, but it is based on one’s internal
or subjective way of relating to societies’ gender norms, structures, and inter-
pretive guides.33 One one approach, defended by Jennifer McKitrick (2015),
someone’s gender in a given context is determined by their behavioral disposi-
tions, given how those behaviors–if manifested–would be socially interpreted.
In a given context, McKitrick argues, someone who is disposed to behave in
ways that others would take to be indicative of a woman, has a woman’s gen-
der identity (and so, is a woman) in that context.34 Like McKitrick, Jenkins’s
(2016, forthcoming) account of gender identity emphasizes an individual’s rela-
tionship to external gender norms. Jenkins proposes a ‘norm relevance’ account,
on which an individual’s gender identity is determined by what gender-specific
norms they experience as relevant to them.35 That is, for example, someone has
a female gender identity–and so is a woman–on this account if they experience
norms associated with women in their social context as relevant to them. More-
over, norm relevance can take on a variety of forms. A female gender identity
for one person may amount to feeling like others should refer to her with fem-
inine pronouns and a certain name, whereas for someone else, it may amount
to having the sense that her physical features ought to be a certain way – e.g.,
ought to include a vulva, and not a penis.36
Gender identities, on both approaches, have personal and social elements:
they are personal insofar as they concern internal dispositions or senses of
norm relevance, but social insofar as these dispositions or senses must relate
to norms or behaviors that are externally, socially associated with a certain
gender group.37 Both McKitrick’s and Jenkins’s approaches could be applied to
‘genderqueer identity’. In fact, Jenkins explicitly proposes one such application:
someone is genderqueer iff they do not consider the norms socially associated
with men, nor the norms socially associated with women, to be relevant to
them.38 To illustrate, Jenkins uses the example of a building that contains only
men’s and women’s toilets. Someone who is nonbinary, because they do not
not address this view in what follows because, while Bettcher’s view may be the best way
to understand binary gender identities, it runs into many of the same concerns I raise for
McKitrick’s (2015) and Jenkins’s (2016) accounts when applied to genderqueer.
33See, e.g., McKitrick (2015), 2580 for an explicit rejection of the essentialism worry.
34The precise formulation of this idea is as follows: “x is gender G iff x has (sufficiently
many, sufficiently strong) dispositions D1-Dn to behave in ways B1-Bn in situations S1-Sn,
and the relevant social group considers behaving in ways B1-Bn in situations S1-Sn to be G.”
McKitrick (2015), 2581.
35Jenkins (forthcoming).
36Jenkins (2016), 413.
37Jenkins (2016), 412.
38Jenkins uses the term ‘nonbinary’ rather than genderqueer, and more formally puts this
idea as follows: “S has a nonbinary gender identity iff S’s internal ‘map’ is neither formed
so as to guide someone marked as a woman through the social or material realities that are,
in that context, characteristic of women as a class nor formed to guide someone classed as a
man through the social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of men as
a class. Jenkins ((2016), 411, fn 40). See also Jenkins (forthcoming).
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consider the norms governing social spaces for either men or women as relevant
to them, may “have all toilets marked as uncomfortable places fraught with
stress and danger.”39
The first thing to notice is that Jenkins’s norm relevancy approach to male
and female gender identity differs dramatically from the approach to nonbinary
gender identity. So long as someone considers some of the female-coded (or
male-coded) norms as relevant to them, they have a female (or male) gender
identity.40 After all, the number of men and women who take all of the norms
associated with men or women as relevant to them likely is few and far between.
But notice that this feature is taken to immediately constrain the proposed
definition of nonbinary (or, in my terms, genderqueer) identities: according to
Jenkins, it cannot simply be the case that nonbinary persons do not take some
or even most of the binary-coded norms as relevant to them. Rather, they must
take none of those norms as relevant to them. Here, the definition begins to
generate a serious worry.
Genderqueers frequently maintain, if only out of necessity, a sense of what
binary-coded norms are relevant for them in spaces where there is no alternative
to these norms. One initial place to see this is in the dual identities of some
genderqueer persons: that is, those who do not exclusively identify as a man or
as a woman, but who claim both a genderqueer as well as male and/or female
identity. Testimony suggests that one common motivation for this dual identifi-
cation is a recognition of the inescapability of binary norms: the gender norms
applied by the state and other persons impact one’s ability to move through the
world. In our current society, saturated in exclusive, binary divisions, there is
no possibility of never taking gender norms to be ‘relevant’ to oneself. Public
spaces, such as toilets and locker rooms, legal institutions, social clubs, language,
and marketing, to name but a few places, are heavily gendered, and gendered
not only according to the binary, but in a way that leaves someone attempting
to navigate these structure no choice but to ‘pick a side’. Moreover, because all
(or nearly all) genderqueer persons were socialized as either men or women, and
often are perceived as men or women, only self-applying the norms of ‘a person
wearing people clothes’ is not possible. Genderqueers who wish to navigate the
world at all, much less safely, have no option but to see binary-norms as more
or less relevant to them.41
Weiss (2018) captures this sentiment when explaining their decision to iden-
tify both as non-binary and as a woman.
I personally identify as a non-binary woman... [T]o me, this identity
acknowledges both that I don’t have an innate identification with
any gender and that I’ve been socialized as a woman.42
Weiss is not alone. In the same article, they interview 24-year-old Rey Noble,
39Jenkins (forthcoming).
40Jenkins thinks that someone could have, for this reason, more than one gender identity
in a given context.
41Andler (2017) raises similar worries for Jenkins’s account of gender identity.
42Weiss (2018).
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who also identifies as non-binary and as a woman. According to Noble, this is
to “acknowledge that she loves her female-coded body but doesn’t always feel
it accurately represents her.”43 Similarly, Laurie Penny, a UK based journalist,
articulates having distinct but compatible reasons for identifying as genderqueer
and as a women. “My identity is more complex than simply female or male,”
Penny writes, “but...I am a woman, politically because that’s how people see
me and that’s how the state treats me.”44
Weiss’s, Noble’s, and Penny’s testimonies speak to the inescapable relevance
of gender norms. At this point, someone might protest that genderqueer identity
is marked by a feeling of discomfort or inauthenticity with (complying with)
those norms. But this dramatically over-generates: many non-genderqueer men
or women also feel discomfort and inauthenticity regarding the gender norms
that they are socially coerced to obey.45
In addition to over-generating, though, it also under-generates. There is an
additional reason why we should be skeptical of the idea that genderqueers do
not take any gender norms to be relevant to themselves: some people locate
their genderqueer identity in their fluidity between different gender categories.
More specifically, this testimony suggests that some genderqueer individuals
experience various gender-specific norms as relevant or apt in different contexts.
For example, in Galupo, et al’s (2018) study of genderqueer persons, many
participants described their gender in ways that include, but are not bound by
only one of the binary options:
“My gender changes. Sometimes I am female, sometimes I am a boy,
sometimes I am both, and sometimes I am neither.” (genderfluid)
“Sometimes I feel like I am completely a man. Sometimes I feel like I
am mostly a man, with some woman/agender mixed in.” (demiguy)
“I can switch in between a variety of genders (man, woman, androg-
yne, agender, third gender, polygender, etc.) day by day.” (gender-
fluid)46
In short, genderqueer persons sometimes do identify as women and/or men,
in Jenkins’s sense. In fact, Galupo, et. al. explicitly observes that “[gen-
derqueer] participants’ gender identit[ies] could not be discretely conceptualized
as ‘male’ ‘female’ ‘neither’ or ‘both’.”47 While Jenkins take the ‘neither’ ap-
proach, then, this way of thinking does not align with genderqueer individuals’
43Weiss (2018).
44Penny (2015).
45Recall that Jenkins (forthcoming) suggests that a nonbinary person would uniquely feel
that gender-marked toilets are “uncomfortable places fraught with stress and danger.” Notice
this would also be true for a gender non-conforming woman or man, an androgynous woman
or man, or perhaps even just a woman or man who dislikes being in gender-marked spaces.
46Galupo, et al. (2018), 12. Participants’ preferred gender labels are in parentheses.
47Galupo, et al. (2018), 18.
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descriptions of their own internal states.48
Setting aside a norm-relevancy approach to genderqueer identity, then, what
about a dispositional approach? Why not think that being genderqueer is less
about what norms one considers relevant to oneself, but rather about what
one is internally disposed to do–e.g., use gender neutral pronouns, assert ‘I am
genderqueer’, and so on? Such an approach might amount to something along
the following lines:
S is genderqueer in a context C iff S is sufficiently disposed to be-
have in C in ways that would (in trans-friendly contexts) mark S as
genderqueer.49
What might the behaviors be? On one interpretation, the relevant behav-
iors for being genderqueer would be different in content, but not in kind from
those for being men and women. That is, the behavioral dispositions relevant
to being genderqueer would include dispositions toward things like “modes of
dress, posture and mannerisms, productive and leisure time activities, styles of
communication and social interaction.”50 But, as we already saw in §3.1, no
such external behaviors decidedly mark someone as genderqueer.
Given this, the scope of relevant behaviors is significantly constrained. In
fact, it seems that the only behaviors that would decidedly mark someone as
genderqueer in a trans-friendly context is them (sincerely) saying so.51 On this
account then, someone is genderqueer so long as they are sufficiently disposed
to assert that they do not exclusively identify as a man or a woman: e.g., ‘I am
genderqueer’, ‘I am nonbinary’, ‘I am gender fluid’.52
Here, two further worries arise. The first concerns the manifestation condi-
tions for these dispositions. I suspect that much of the motivation for adopting
a dispositionalist account of genderqueer identity is gaining the ability to count
persons as genderqueer even when these dispositions are masked or counteracted
by social costs, such as the threat of bullying, discrimination, being fired, as-
saulted, or simply misunderstood. Rather than seeing someone as genderqueer
only in contexts where they in fact say so, a dispositionalist approach would
allow us to count as genderqueer anyone who would–under certain conditions–
assert that they are genderqueer. Someone who is prevented from openly as-
serting a genderqueer identity due social costs, then, can still be genderqueer.
48Galupo, et al. (2018), 18.
49This proposal is an adaption from McKitrick (2016), who does not emphasize trans-
friendly contexts. This proposal would, for reasons that are hopefully clear, be even further
off target: in dominant context, no behaviors would mark someone as genderqueer, because
this category is not recognized in those contexts.
50McKitrick (2016), 2581.
51Although not framed dispositionally, a similar proposal was suggested by Riki Wilchins
(2017), 101: “With nonbinary people, it is the identifying act of saying one is ‘nonbi-
nary’...which is central to identity?”
52I leave open that assertion occurs in many ways, including writing, sign-language, etc.
Many nonbinary youth depend on social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube, to
communicate their gender identification. See Singh (2013), 698.
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Given this, the thought goes, we should privilege how that person would
be, were it less-or-not-at-all socially costly, to be genderqueer. From here, we
arrive at the idea that someone is genderqueer just in case, were the social costs
sufficiently low, they would assert that they do not identify exclusively as a man
or a woman. But what are these conditions? If they are ones where some social
costs remain, then it would seem to prevent those with low risk tolerance from
being genderqueer: some people who might be willing to assert a genderqueer
identity under no social costs might be unwilling to do so even in the face of small
or infrequent costs. So leaving any social costs in the manifestation conditions
means that only some people, but not others, can have a genderqueer identity.
Suppose, then, the manifestation conditions are ones with no social costs.
First, it seems likely that, in such a scenario, many persons who currently and
comfortably identify exclusively within the binary might begin to assert other,
nonbinary identities.53 That is, if being nonbinary were completely socially
accepted, such that no difficulties or prejudices faced those resisting binary cat-
egorization, why think that those who, under actual conditions, do not consider
themselves nonbinary, would continue to do so? Regardless of which way we
go, then, it seems this view gets the extension of genderqueer wrong even by its
own lights: it will either exclude those with a low risk tolerance, or extend the
category to persons who in fact take themselves to have a binary identity, but
who might think otherwise in lieu of social repercussions.
The second, and I think even more important worry for this dispositional
account is that it metaphysically trivializes being genderqueer. Regardless of
the manifestation conditions for a dispositional account, we’ve seen that the
most plausible behaviors that, when manifested, would be socially considered
determinative of being genderqueer are assertions that one is genderqueer. But,
in that case, being genderqueer amounts to nothing more than a linguistic con-
struction: there is nothing substantively different between someone who is and
someone who is not genderqueer. The only difference is that one, but not the
other, is disposed to use certain terms to describe themself. On this disposi-
tional account, no difference other than this is necessary (or sufficient) for being
genderqueer. It is hard to see, for this reason, what the content of such terms
might be, or what the difference between ‘sincere’ and ‘non-sincere’ assertion
of identity might amount to. ‘Genderqueer’, ‘nonbinary’, ‘agender’, etc. seem
reduced to empty (or at least opaque) labels.
It may turn out, in the end, that genderqueer identity amounts to nothing
more than self-describing using certain terms. But if possible, we should–and I
think can–do better. To that end, I turn now to a new proposal: genderqueer
as a critical gender kind.
53The same point holds for the scenario with very low social costs, but is more obvious
when all costs are removed.
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4 A New Approach: Critical Gender Kinds
What explains being genderqueer? Is asserting one’s preferred gender label
sufficient? Is it necessary? Is gender non-conformity or androgyny sufficient,
even if not necessary? These questions are complicated by the fact that, as we’ve
seen, purely external factors are insufficient for understanding genderqueer, and
appealing instead to gender identity only pushes us to ask what might constitute
a genderqueer identity. While it is tempting to think of this identity in terms
of wholly internal features, such as a sense of norm relevance or a disposition to
assert an identity claim, we’ve seen why these approaches fall short. So what
could the difference between genderqueer and non-genderqueer persons amount
to?
The solution, I suggest, lies in understanding the category genderqueer not
in terms of external or internal features, but rather in terms of political features
– in particular, features that combine both external and internal components. I
suggest that genderqueer is best understood as a category whose members col-
lectively resist the assumption that men and women are discrete, exclusive, and
exhaustive gender categories, and where this resistance arises from the mem-
bers’ felt or desired gender categorization outside this exclusive and exhaustive
binary.
Importantly, I do not assume that each member of genderqueer must or will
successfully resist this assumption, or even do so in a way that is intelligible to
others. For an individual to be genderqueer, on my view, only requires that
they take part in such resistance. While I say more about this below, I will
not try to give precise conditions for what this ‘taking part’ requires. In part,
this is because I think there are no such precise conditions; certainly, there are
not context-independent conditions. Primarily, though, it is because my central
target for analysis is the kind genderqueer, and not the individual property being
genderqueer. Although it is common to conflate these projects – indeed, they
are treated as one within existing externalist and internalist models of gender
categories – I think to do so is a mistake. It is already well recognized that
explanatory individualism, or the idea that the explanation for a social kind or
phenomenon reduces to facts about individuals, is typically not an apt way to
approach social ontology.54 Just as an analysis of Christianity would be different
than an analysis of what it takes for an individual to be a Christian, so too an
analysis of genderqueer is distinct from (though, of course, intimately related
to) an analysis of what it takes for an individual to be genderqueer. To the
extent that I am interested in individuals, it is in service of understanding how,
as a collective, these individuals resist the gender binary.
What is the best way to understand a gender kind of this sort? I propose
that, to do so, we must recognize a new type of gender kind: a critical gender
kind.
Critical Gender Kinds: For any gender kind X, X is a critical
gender kind relative to a given society iff Xs members collectively
54See, e.g., Epstein (2009), Haslanger (2016).
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resist the dominant gender ideology in that society.55
Note that this definition leaves open the motivation or cause for collective
resistance to dominant gender ideology. I take it that this resistance can be
motivated or caused in many ways. For our current purpose of analyzing gen-
derqueer, I want to specifically highlight at least two importantly distinct, but
compatible motivations: principled resistance and existential resistance. We can
understand these as follows:
Principled Resistance: Principled resistance to dominant gender
ideology is resistance that stems from or otherwise expresses indi-
viduals’ social or political commitments regarding gendered norms,
practices, and structures.
Existential Resistance: Existential resistance to dominant gen-
der ideology is resistance that stems from or otherwise expresses
individuals’ felt or desired gender role and/or categorization.
Principled resistance is a common practice, shared among a variety of ac-
tivists, allies, and members of gender and sexual minority groups. For example,
whenever someone speaks out against sexist, transphobic, or heteronormative
practices and does so from their commitment to gender or sexual equality, this
person enacts principled resistance to dominant gender ideology. Attending
Take Back the Night or gay pride marches, voting for politicians who support
trans-rights, donating to organizations that advocate for women’s reproductive
rights, using gender-neutral pronouns, or having a gender non-conforming aes-
thetic are just a few examples of resistant behaviors that are open to everyone.
Many engage in these behaviors not (or not only) because of their own felt or
desired gender role or position, but (also) because they have values and beliefs
that commit them to resist dominant gender norms, practices, and structures.
These persons are, in my view, jointly engaged in principled resistance to dom-
inant gender ideology.
More can and should be said about principled resistance. But because my
account of genderqueer relies on the notion of existential resistance, I’ve de-
scribed the phenomenon of principled resistance primarily for the purpose of
contrast. Unlike its sibling, existential resistance stems from one’s felt or de-
sired place within gender roles or categories – typically, a role or categorization
that is deviant given the practices, norms, and structures that arise from and
sustain dominant gender ideology.
To more sharply distinguish between these modes of resistance, suppose you
meet two persons who use the gender neutral pronouns ‘they/them’. One does
55By ‘society’, I roughly mean communities of persons with shared clusters of beliefs, con-
cepts, and attitudes that give rise to concrete social practices and structures. These clusters
facilitate social interaction; they make it possible to “interpret and organize information and
coordinate action, thought, and affect.” (Haslanger 2016, 126) They also can be individuated
with more or less fine grain. By ‘dominant gender ideology’, I mean the beliefs, concepts,
and attitudes toward gender that have the most social power within a society, and that im-
pose (often unreflectively) their shared epistemic, conceptual, and affective systems onto less
powerful communities.
16
not consider themself nonbinary in any sense, but uses these pronouns because
they are committed to making English more hospitable for nonbinary persons.56
The other uses these pronouns because they consider themself genderqueer, and
so take both ‘she’ and ‘he’ to misdescribe their sense of their own gender. In this
case, it may be that both persons manifest principled resistance to the dominant
belief that everyone is either a man or a woman. But only the second person
manifests existential resistance to this belief. And this is because the second, but
not the first, engages in resistant behavior–here, use of gender neutral pronouns–
due to their felt or desired categorization outside of the gender binary. In line
with this example, I propose that the key mark of existential resistance is the
source of the resistance: namely, subjectively felt or desired gender role or
categorization.
The distinction between principled and existential resistance helps us artic-
ulate the difference between allies and members of gender kinds such as gen-
derqueer and trans: while both resist dominant gender ideology, members of
these kinds resist (at least in part) because they perceive/feel themselves to
have or desire to have a gender categorization that deviates from dominant ex-
pectations and assumptions. That is, who they take or desire themselves to be
is itself incompatible with or otherwise does not conform to the categorization
imposed on them by dominant gender ideology. Importantly, though, this is
not a purely internalistic notion of genderqueer: an internal relationship to gen-
der categories is only one piece of the characterization. Collective resistance by
those who experience this relationship is also required. Moreover, by including
‘desired’ alongside ‘felt’, I hope to capture a broader range of phenomenological
states with respect to gender categorization than those emphasized by Jenkins
and McKitrick. This ‘desire’ could be based on political (or perhaps religious)
motivations, in addition to an internal sense of gender authenticity, relevance,
belonging, or dysphoria.57
To be clear, critical gender kinds are not the only gender kinds whose mem-
bers stand in political relationships to dominant gender ideology. All gender
kinds are political, and all persons stand in relationships–both principled and
existential–to gender ideology. When these reactions affirm dominant ideology,
we can describe those who manifest them as belonging to non-critical gender
kinds:
Non-Critical Gender Kinds: For any gender kind X, X is a non-
critical gender kind relative to a given society iff Xs members collec-
tively reinforce the dominant gender ideology in that society.
As above, we can divide reenforcement into both principled and existen-
tial modes. Someone who considers themself a man and on this basis enacts a
hegemonic masculinity (relational to his class, race, etc.) manifests existential
reenforcement of the dominant assumption that men ought to behave in stereo-
typically masculine ways. In contrast, someone who considers themself a woman
56See Dembroff & Wodak (2018) for further argument on this point.
57Thanks to Alicia Fowler for alerting me to the possibility of religiously motivated resistance
to the binary assumption.
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but uses slurs to describe gay or effeminate men, and does so on the basis of
beliefs about how men ought to behave, manifests principled reenforcement of
this dominant assumption.58
To be clear: a single individual can belong to both critical and non-critical
gender kinds. The critical/non-critical distinction is not intended as another
binary into which individuals can be exclusively sorted. In fact, I suspect it
is unavoidable to belong to both types of kinds: we all belong to a variety of
political gender kinds–critical and non-critical–as well as externalist and inter-
nalist gender kinds. My focus here is on genderqueer as a particular, critical
gender kind. But my account does not preclude that members of genderqueer
simultaneously belong to many more gender kinds.
Of course, saying that genderqueer is a critical gender kind is nowhere near
the level of specificity needed to understand this kind. Even once we narrow
our scope to so-called ‘western’ societies, we find there are many critical gen-
der kinds, and they can be identified to various degrees of specificity, relative
to how fine-grained one describes (an aspect of) the dominant gender ideol-
ogy.59 To draw this out, and further motivate thinking of genderqueer as a crit-
ical gender kind, let’s consider the gender ideology that dominates in western
societies. Broadly speaking, a vast number of social groups resist this ideol-
ogy: to name but a name, trans men, trans women, abortion rights activists,
butch dykes, drag queens, genderqueers, stay-at-home dads, female powerlifters,
tomboys, polyamorous persons and on and on. That is, in both principled and
existential ways (among others), multiple groups resist normative, gendered so-
cial expectations regarding their bodies, presentations, gender roles, and other
ways of being.
On one way of thinking about critical gender kinds, then, all of these various
and sundry groups might be classified together within one kind:
(Western) Gender Defiers: (Western) gender defiers is a criti-
cal gender kind, whose members collectively resist dominant gender
ideology in Western societies.
In at least two ways, this definition is not particularly illuminating. First,
how might one go about deciding who does or does not count as a gender
defier without a more detailed analysis of what composes the dominant gender
ideology in question? Second, with respect to genderqueer, if genderqueers make
up but one piece of gender defiers, this does not illuminate what is unique to
genderqueer. It seems that, in order to give an analysis of genderqueer, we need
a better idea of what aspect of dominant gender ideology genderqueers resist, as
well as how they do so. All in all: more details are needed.
58Insofar as this person’s behavior may also be motivated by her beliefs about her own
gender role with respect to (e.g.) encouraging male masculinity, she may also thereby manifest
existential reenforcement of this assumption.
59Throughout this paper, I use ‘Western’ as an imperfect shorthand, while also recognizing
that this term is flawed–see, e.g, Appiah (2016). If the reader prefers to talk about, e.g., ‘the
Global North’ or ‘postcolonial societies’, they can substitute their preferred term.
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To this end, I propose a more (but still not very) fine-grained, tripartite pic-
ture of western dominant gender ideology.60 On this picture, the ideology can be
thought of as having three distinct, but interconnected and mutually reinforcing
axes: the genital assumption, the binary assumption, and the social assumption.
While no one of these axes can be fully understood apart from the others, for
the sake of analysis we can somewhat artificially take each individually:
The genital assumption: Someone’s gender is determined by their
natal external genitalia.61
The binary assumption: The only possible genders are the bi-
nary, discrete, exclusive, and exhaustive kinds men and women.62
The social assumption: Someone’s gender determines63 what
their hierarchical social role ought to be. More specifically: males
ought to have masculine roles, females ought to have feminine roles,
and feminine roles are inferior to masculine roles.64
60This picture diverges from, but was inspired by a description of ‘the postcolonial under-
standing of gender’ in Tan (manuscript).
61This assumption, combined with the binary assumption, fails to acknowledge the reality of
persons born with genitalia that defies exclusive classification as male or female. This is not a
shortcoming with my description of the assumption; rather, my description accurately capture
the prevalent assumption that leads to the erasure of these persons, as well as unnecessary
medical interventions on children born with so-called ‘ambiguous genitalia’. See, e.g., Chase
(1998) & Bettcher (2016).
62The binary assumption builds normative social roles into men and women (perhaps in
addition to genital information). A genderqueer person does not reject the idea that they
must have, e.g., either a penis or a vagina: in rejecting the binary assumption, they are
rejecting the notion that they must exclusively belong to one of two kinds with normative
social roles. See Dembroff (2018).
63By this, I do not mean to imply that gender is assumed to ‘wholly determine’ one’s social
role, given that even within this ideology, people often assume that other, intersecting social
identities–such as race, class, and ability–also determine someone’s social role.
64Here I follow, but make a tripartite distinction within feminist theories on which gender
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All three axes together establish an ideology that exclusively divides bodies
into two categories, and establishes a self-perpetuating hierarchy between them,
with persons whose bodies are sexed as male placed in a position of dominance
over persons whose bodies are sexed as female.65 Within this framework, we
could spell out a variety of (non-exclusive!) critical gender kinds whose members
enact existential or principled resistance to these axes.66 For example, those
persons who claim categorization other than the gender that they were assigned
based on their natal genitalia–a property I consider sufficient for being trans–
manifests existential resistance to the genital assumption. Similarly, anyone
who considers themself a butch lesbian, defying social expectations with respect
to their gender presentation and sexuality, manifests existential resistance to
the social assumption.67
I propose that genderqueer is best understood as a critical gender kind whose
members collectively resist the binary assumption. More specifically, I propose
that its members manifest existential resistance against the assumption that
they must belong to one of two discrete, exhaustive, and exclusive gender kinds
(men/women): that is, binary kinds that do not overlap (discrete) and account
for all persons (exhaustive), and are such that one person cannot belong to both
kinds (exclusive). Moreover, these members do so on the basis of a felt or desired
gender categorization that is ontologically incompatible with this assumption.
We can put this more formally as follows:
Genderqueer: Genderqueer is a critical gender kind, such that its
members have a felt or desired gender categorization that conflicts
with the binary assumption, and on this basis enact collective exis-
tential resistance to the binary assumption.68
On this proposed understanding of genderqueer, genderqueers collectively
and existentially resist the binary assumption.That is, this collective resistance
within Western contexts is “traditionally assumed to be based on a binary, mandatory system
that attributes social characteristics to sexed anatomy, with humans categorized from birth
as male vs female based on their external genitalia.” See Nagoshi, et al. (2012, p. 407),
referencing Hausman (2001). See Witt (2011), Frye (1983), Wittig (1992) among many, many
others for further discussion. The ideas that masculinity and femininity are oppositional and
hierarchical is further developed in Serano (2016, pp. 100-113) under the labels ’oppositional
sexism’ and ’traditional sexism’.
65Though, of course, much more goes into the social assumptions for ‘females’ and ‘males’
than things that establish or perpetuate this hierarchy. Indeed, I do not mean to suggest that
(many aspects of) masculinity and femininity per se are problematic–an unfortunate sugges-
tion of previous versions of feminism–but rather that gendered social roles are problematic
when policed along the lines of binary, biological categories.
66While various targets of resistance are compatible, some groups treat them as exclusive.
For example, one ‘radical feminist’ position is that resistance to the social assumption is
incompatible with resistance to the genital and binary assumptions.
67See, e.g., Rich (1980) & Halberstam (1998).
68I do not mean to suggest that all genderqueers resist the binary assumption under this
theoretical guise. Most often, they simply reject the idea that they must be neatly and
permanently categorized as either a man or woman–that they must comply with binary gender
classification. This harkens to the familiar feminist point that the ‘personal is political’: even
if a genderqueer person does not conceptualize (e.g.) use of gender-neutral pronouns as
resistance, it is.
20
is rooted in genderqueer’s members felt or desired gender classifications that
defy the binary assumption. This point is important because it demarcates
genderqueer as a kind such that internal features (here, personal relationship to
gender categorization), as well as external features (here, ideological resistance)
are required to adequately model this kind.
This dualistic feature brings a number of important implications. First, it
suggests that genderqueer cannot exist in contexts where persons are so bereft
of access to gender deviant presentations, concepts, and language that they are
unable to perform speech acts and behaviors that would collectively resist the
binary assumption.69 That is: I do not think genderqueer is adequately cap-
tured solely in terms of internal features, such as a dislike of being gendered
within the binary, or intentions to resist the binary assumption. Genderqueer
is not a merely psychological phenomenon. For one thing, this would overex-
tend genderqueer. No doubt, many people who would not consider themselves
(or be considered) genderqueer dislike being gendered within the binary, but
have resigned themselves to it or otherwise accepted it as part of their lives.
For another, this would remove the force of queer within genderqueer. If being
genderqueer were simply in the head, a world functioning smoothly according
to the binary assumption, with no material challenges to this binary, could very
well be a world full of genderqueers. This, to me, seems like a reductio: re-
sistance to gender binary systems requires more than thought and affect. This
point aligns with genderqueers’ description of being nonbinary as a way of “re-
ject[ing] such [binary] systems that lead to harmful stereotypes and oppression”
and “breaking down what it means to be a gendered person in the world.”70
Neither resistance nor breaking down others’ assumptions occur merely within
the head.71
Second, it suggests that genderqueer does not exist simply by virtue of there
being a group of persons who adopt gender presentations, language, or behaviors
that resist the binary assumption. As seen in §3.1, external features are not
sufficient for modeling genderqueer. Androgyny, use of gender neutral pronouns,
and so on, are features that are not universal among genderqueers, and also
are shared by many persons who identify within the binary. These features
may well function to resist the binary assumption, even when manifested by
binary-identified persons, but for this reason, resistance alone is not sufficient
to understand genderqueer.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this dualistic analysis leaves space
for variation across both the mental states accompanying felt or desired gender
categorization outside of the binary, as well as the modes of resistance taken by
genderqueer persons. The construction of binary gender kinds (men/women),
as well as the latitude individuals have within them and how individuals are
69Relatedly, it suggests that genderqueer will not exist in a world so ignorant of nonbinary
persons that their acts of resistance are consistently mis-/re-interpreted so as to neutralize
any resistance to the binary assumption.
70Taluson (2017).
71While I lack space to explore this here, this point suggests fruitful intersections between
discussion of critical gender kinds and hermeneutical injustice, as described in Fricker (2007).
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socialized into them, vary dramatically across intersections with other social
identities, such as race, class, and disability. For this reason, my model inten-
tionally leaves open that within the group of genderqueer persons, one can (and
I suspect will) find a vast range of concepts about and attitudes towards these
binary kinds, as well as strategies for resisting binary categorization.72
What is central to genderqueer, I suggest, is found at the intersection of
external and internal features. In particular, it is collective, existential resis-
tance to the practices and structures that arise from and reinforce the binary
assumption. This resistance is multiply realizable: again, there is no one, much
less one right way to be genderqueer. Many forms of resistance are possible.
Some common strategies will be familiar: using gender-neutral pronouns (and
other terms, like the title ‘Mx.’), cultivating gender non-conforming aesthetics,
asserting one’s gender categorization (e.g., ‘I am nonbinary’), queering personal
relationships, defying sexual binaries, and what I’ll call ‘space switching’, or
moving between male and female gendered spaces. While, again, no single one
of these features is unique to or required in order to be genderqueer, they are
familiar tools that genderqueers use to resist the idea that they themselves must
comply with binary categorization. What they share–and what is, I think, a con-
straint on what can aptly be called ‘resistance’ to dominant gender ideology–is
that they violate what Kate Bornstein (1994) call the ‘gender rules’: the binary
set of norms that are imposed and enforced (via social practices, material struc-
tures, and various forms of gender policing) upon individuals according to the
sexed interpretation of their bodies.73 Violating these rules challenges or defies
dominant gender practices and structures. As these practices and structures are
many, so too are the possible modes of resistance, which we again can expect to
vary widely across intersectional contexts and individuals. To name but a few:
1. Gender-neutral pronouns: Communicating that one uses gender neu-
tral pronouns (e.g., ze/zim/zis, they/them/theirs) rather than a gender
specific pronoun (e.g., he/him/his, she/her/hers).74
2. Gender non-conforming aesthetics: Gender presentations that violate
cultural gendered expectations (e.g., cross-dressing, androgyny).75
72Thanks to Jorge Meneses for raising this point.
73This approach, I think, nicely aligns with genderqueers shared sense of ignoring and/or
breaking gender rules. As one genderqueer person comments in “Gender Can Be Both Lib-
erating And Stifling At The Same Time” (2018): “I’m what people would be if gender rules
didn’t really exist.”
74And similarly for other gender neutral language–e.g., ‘human’ over ’man’ or ’woman’,
‘parent’ over ‘mother’ or ‘father’, or using a chosen, gender ambiguous name over one’s birth
name. The importance of generating gender neutral language in the service of breaking down
the binary assumption cannot, I think, be understated, given the close relationship between
language and available concepts. See, e.g., Wittig (1992), 55: “We must produce a political
transformation of the key concepts, that is of the concepts which are strategic for us. For
there is another order of materiality, that of language, and language is worked upon from
within by these strategic concepts.”
75Transgressive gender aesthetics are a long standing tradition of queering gender. Marjorie
Garber (1992), for example, discusses transvestism as a way to create a crisis not only for the
gender binary, but for the stability of gender categorization altogether.
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3. Gender categorization assertions: Articulating one own sense of gen-
der kind membership (e.g., ‘I am nonbinary’, ‘I am genderfluid’).
4. Queering personal relationships: Fluidity between or violation of tra-
ditional gender roles within personal relationships (e.g., taking on certain
traditional female parenting roles as well as male roles, gender play in
sexual relationships).76 77
5. Eschewing sexuality binaries: Identifying one’s sexuality outside of
the ‘gay’, ‘straight’, or ‘bisexual’ taxonomy, which is based on a binary
gender system.78
6. Space switching: Fluidity between female and male coded material
spaces (e.g. using both men’s and women’s bathrooms, moving between
male and female friend groups).79
This list is by no means exhaustive of the many ways in which genderqueer
people resist captivity within the gender binary.80 My purpose is not to provide
an exhaustive list of ways to be genderqueer, but rather to illustrate the dappled
and diverse nature of genderqueer resistance. While some of these modes of re-
sistance (e.g. assertion) will be more easily interpreted by others as resisting the
binary assumption, others (e.g., gender non-conformity) admit more ambiguity.
Moreover, genderqueers will not use the same or perhaps any of these enact-
ments at all times or spaces. Someone who uses gender-neutral pronouns with
friends may not do so at work. Someone who will assert a genderqueer identity
in explicitly trans-inclusive groups may not do so outside of these groups. Gen-
derqueers enact their identities in multiple ways because genderqueer does not
present a new set of gender norms: it seeks to disrupt existing gender norms.
That is: genderqueers are not aiming to maintain a grey, androgynous middle
ground between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’, but rather, to
76Mo, a female-assigned genderqueer person describes this enactment of genderqueerness.
“My feelings about my gender are not dependent on [how I am perceived],” they say, “but
are more tied in to how I identify with people (men as much as women, and trans people of
all kinds) and how I relate to my family (as a husband and dad), etc.” Mo Interview (2018).
(Mo’s last name has been omitted to maintain anonymity.)
77Any queering of sexual relationships is typically met with the strongest negative reaction
from dominant culture. According to Murray David (1983), this is because these gender
violations directly challenge others’ pervasive reliance on binary sexual norms to organize
their lives. Cited in Bornstein (1994), 72.
78Nagoshi, et al. (2012) provides qualitative empirical data concerning the close relationship
between gender and sexual identities. At one genderqueer participant, AJ, reported, “I identify
as queer as my sexual identity... I don’t really see that there really is a binary. So I wouldn’t
even say bisexual, because that’s still acknowledging that there’s a binary system.” (217).
For further empirical discussion, see Bradford, et al. (2018), p. 5. See also Dembroff (2016)
for philosophical discussion on the relationship between gender and sexual identity.
79Like all of the above, space switching is a way of breaking and also fluidly navigating binary
gender rules. “[Fluidity across gender rules generates] the ability to freely and knowingly
become one or many of a limitless number of genders for any length of time, at any rate of
change. Gender fluidity recognises no borders or rules of gender.” Bornstein (1994, 52.)
80For empirical data on the various strategies toward genderqueer expression, see Richard
et al. (2016).
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resist the cultural command to accept these binary categories as the categories
by which one must be identified, labeled, and evaluated. This point is further
reinforced by qualitative empirical research on genderqueer identities. Bradford
et al (2018) notes that while models of gender typically expect gender to be
stable and predictable, “having the agency to make decisions regarding one’s
body and identity may be an integral component of genderqueer identity devel-
opment” – one that often results in a “process of experimentation.”81 Again,
though, my focus is on the collective effects of this resistance, rather than on the
effect of any single individual’s acts of resistance. Given this, there is plenty of
room underneath the umbrella of genderqueer for a variety of resistant strategies,
varying in type, clarity, and strength.
In closing, I want to draw out two key upshots of the proposed view. First,
the category genderqueer is socially located. Because genderqueer, on my pro-
posal, essentially involves existential resistance to the binary assumption, as
understood within western gender ideology, it is largely constrained to contexts
where western gender ideology is dominant. This is because ‘resistance’, I take
it, connotes at minimum a defiant reaction. However, this is not to ignore a
closely related kind–one whose members challenge, via resistance or not–the
binary assumption. Such a category would unify genderqueer with the variety
of genders beyond male and female recognized in other societies, such as In-
donesia’s waria, Native American two-spirit, and Samoan fa’afafine. In this, we
have the tools for finding important similarities and points of solidarity between
critical gender kinds in a given context with gender kinds across other contexts.
We also thereby have a framework for interpreting common claims to the tune
of ‘nonbinary persons have always existed everywhere’. If we interpret ‘nonbi-
nary’, in such a claim, as anyone whose social existence challenges the binary
assumption, then we can look to any time or society to identify such persons.
Alternatively, if we interpret it as concerning existential resistance to the binary
assumption, then our search will be constrained to contexts where this assump-
tion is dominant, pointing to important differences between genderqueer, as here
defined, and categories such as waria.
Second, insofar as I have described genderqueer in terms of collective re-
sistance to the binary assumption, one might worry that being genderqueer,
on my proposal, requires that an individual must–to some extent and in some
context–resist the binary assumption.82 No doubt, some will find this result
unpalatable, for reasons discussed in §3.2. Many people prefer to think of being
genderqueer as something that can be wholly internal, such that someone could
be entirely closeted and remain genderqueer. This internalized approach is rei-
fied by common narratives of ‘discovering’ or ‘realizing’ that one is genderqueer,
as opposed to ‘choosing to be’ or ‘becoming’ genderqueer. At the same time,
these narratives are counterbalanced by other, also common narratives such as,
“I [finally] get to be who I want to be,” or “I... try to get to a place where I can
81Bradford (2018), 8.
82My proposal might, in this sense, be thought in the spirit of Butler’s (1997) ‘symbolic
interactionism’, or the idea that an individual’s gender is created an sustained through “re-
flecting back images of the self as objects.” Hird (2012), 585.
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safely be myself.”83 One might worry that my account precludes those in hostile
environments with heavy costs of defying gender rules from being genderqueer.
In response, I first want to again emphasize that my project primarily con-
cerns the category genderqueer and not the individual property of being gen-
derqueer. It may well be that, while the category essentially concerns political
resistance, external resistance is not required of each and every member of this
category. Consider, for analogy, the category L.A. Dodgers fans. Presumably,
this category is only properly understood as a social phenomenon–a collective of
people that support the Dodgers by attending games, buying merchandise, and
so on. This, however, does not mean that in order for an individual to belong to
this category, they must engage in socially perceived fan-like behaviors: perhaps
it is sufficient that they themselves are aware of their support for the Dodgers,
even if they keep this a secret.
To be honest, I myself am not convinced that internal states should be con-
sidered sufficient for being genderqueer: I tentatively suggest this ‘way out’
for those who demand that they must be. I myself lean toward the thought
that some externalized resistance is required for being genderqueer, keeping in
mind that resistance is multiply realizable and need not not be successful.84
Indeed, there are myriad ways that someone could manifest resistance to the
gender binary without incurring heavy social costs, even in hostile environments.
While pronoun pins, cultivating androgyny, or simply asserting one’s identity
are all clear ways of resisting the binary assumption, nothing so loud is re-
quired by my proposal, which emphasizes collective over individual resistance.
As one agender person put this, “[S]ometimes when we dress ourselves, or when
we find...moments of authenticity, they are acts of resistance even when they’re
small.”85 My proposal leaves these ‘small acts of resistance’ open to genderqueer
persons, and does not require social uptake of any given individual’s acts of re-
sistance, even if, given the political nature of this category, some degree of social
uptake of its members’ collective resistant actions is required for the category’s
existence.
I agree that social costs nevertheless could prevent someone from resisting
the binary in any way, despite felt or desired nonbinary identification. However,
I diverge from standard interpretations of this situation, which say that this
person is ‘truly’ genderqueer, and unjustly prevented from self-expression. In
contrast, I read the situation as one in which someone is unjustly prevented from
being genderqueer. Referring to ‘closeted’ genderqueers–rather than people who
are unwillingly forced into binary classification–downplays both the power of
social forces over our access to social identities, as well as how oppressive that
power can be. Someone who is forced to follow all the gender rules out of fear
is, by my lights, prevented by an unjust social system from being genderqueer–
the cost of ideological resistance is untenable. This is not merely a stifling of
self-expression, but a stifling of self-realization: if genderqueer is centrally about
83“Gender Can Be Both Liberating And Stifling At The Same Time” (2018), Brehob (2018).
84Dembroff & Saint-Croix (forthcoming) refer to this combination of internalized and ex-
ternalized identity as ‘agential identity’, or the bridge between self- and social-perception.
85“Gender Can Be Both Liberating And Stifling At The Same Time” (2018)
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resistance to the binary assumption, oppressive social factors have the potential
to prevent its realization.86 In contexts where someone wants to resist binary
classification, but faces untenable costs of doing so, the central injustice is not, I
think, a lack of recognition. Rather, it is a lack of freedom with respect to one’s
ability to resist gender classification. Emily Brehob, who identifies as intersex
and nonbinary, describes being caught in such a situation:
Now that I live in Texas, I find it more difficult to walk the line of
affirming my identity to myself while remaining safe. I find myself
reverting to the mean: growing my hair long, letting it slide when
people call me a woman... Is my identity even real if I don’t express
it? ... There something incredibly powerful–revolutionary, even–
about challenging someone’s understanding of gender with your very
existence.87
Understanding genderqueer as a critical gender kind whose members collec-
tively manifest existential resistance to the binary assumption helps us under-
stand the experiences of persons like Brehob. Being genderqueer is not simply
in the head: it challenges dominant gender ideology ‘with one’s very existence’.
To understand this gender kind, we needed a new model–one that captures the
interplay between ideological resistance and gender identification. I’ve proposed
one such model, and no doubt there are others. But if one thing is clear, it is
that if we are to understand this cultural revolution, we need new concepts,
new language, and new metaphysics. Armed with these tools, we can join Riki
Wilchins in wondering if we are “unconsciously and finally treading towards the
end of gender categories as we know them.”88 Either way, I agree with Wilchins:
“It will be fun finding out.”89
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